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Abstract
We argue that the boldest claims of Big Data are in need of revision
and toning-down, in view of a few basic lessons learned from the science
of complex systems. We point out that, once the most extravagant claims
of Big Data are properly discarded, a synergistic merging of BD with big
theory offers considerable potential to spawn a new scientific paradigm
capable of overcoming some of the major barriers confronted by the mod-
ern scientific method originating with Galileo. These obstacles are due to
the presence of nonlinearity, nonlocality and hyperdimensions which one
encounters frequently in multiscale modelling.
1 Introduction
Our current society is characterised by an unprecedented ability to produce
and store breathtaking amounts of data and, much more importantly, by the
ability to navigate across them in such a way as to distil useful information,
hence knowledge, therefrom. This has now reached the point of spawning a
separate discipline, so-called “Big Data” (BD), which has taken the scientific and
business domains by storm. Like all technological revolutions, the import of BD
goes far beyond the scientific realm, reaching down into deep philosophical and
epistemological questions, not to mention societal ones. One of most relevant
is: are we facing a new epoch in which the power of data renders obsolete the
∗Corresponding author: Peter V. Coveney, p.v.coveney@ucl.ac.uk
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
09
51
5v
1 
 [c
s.G
L]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
18
use of the scientific method as we have known it since Galileo? That is, insight
gained through a self-reinforcing loop between experimental data and theoretical
analysis, based on the use of mathematics and modelling?
For if, as sometimes appears true today, anything can be inferred by de-
tecting patterns within huge databases, what’s the point of modelling anymore?
This extreme stance is summarised in Anderson’s provocative statement: “With
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves, correlation replaces causation,
and science can advance even without coherent models or unified theories”. In
a nutshell, it is a data-driven version of Archimedes’ fulcrum: give me enough
data and I shall move the world. As radical as this new empiricism is, it brings
up an intriguing point: is understanding overrated? Could it be that smart al-
gorithmic search through oceans of data can spare us the labour (and the joys)
of learning how the world works[1]?
“Why learn, if you can look it up”? is another way of articulating the same
idea. At least among intellectuals, the retort is that of C.S. Lewis, “Once you
have surrendered your brain, you’ve surrendered your life” (paraphrased) [2].
In the sequel, we shall offer rational arguments in support of this instinctive
reaction whilst recognising the perspectives opened up by BD approaches.
2 Why is Big Data so sexy?
Big Data flourishes upon four main observations, namely:
(i) The explosive growth of data production/acquisition/navigation capabil-
ities.
(ii) Reading off patterns from complex datasets through smart search al-
gorithms may be faster and more revealing than modelling the underlying be-
haviour i.e. using theory.
(iii) It applies to any discipline, including those traditionally not deemed
suitable for mathematical treatment, including Life Sciences (another way of
putting this is to suggest that these domains are too complex to be modelled).
(iv) Its involvement in immediate application to business and politics, “opin-
ion dynamics”, “sentiment analysis” and so on, furnishes another set of domains
which raise many ethical questions.
While the four points above hold disruptive potential for science and society,
in the following we shall illustrate how and why, based on basic findings within
the modern science of complexity, all of them may lead to false expectations and,
at their nadir, even to dangerous social, economical and political manipulation.
The four points we shall make in response are the following:
1. Complex systems are strongly correlated, hence they do not (generally)
obey Gaussian statistics.
2. No data is big enough for systems with strong sensitivity to data inaccu-
racies.
3. Correlation does not imply causation, the link between the two becoming
exponentially fainter at increasing data size.
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4. In a finite-capacity world, too much data is just as bad as no data.
Far from being exceptional, our four assertions apply to most complex systems of
relevance to modern science and society, such as far from equilibrium nonlinear
physics, finance, wealth distribution and many social phenomena as well. So,
there can be no excuse for ignoring them.
3 Complex systems do not (generally) obey Gaus-
sian statistics
Big Data radicalism draws heavily upon a fairly general fact of life: the Law of
Large Numbers (LLN), the main content of which is that, with enough samples,
call it N , error (uncertainty) are bound to surrender to certainty. The most
famous aspect of which is the square-root law of the noise/signal ratio:
σ
m
∝ 1√
N
(1)
where m is the mean value and σ its root-mean-square associated to a given
stochastic process X. In other words, let mN = (x1 + . . . xN )/N be the mean
value of a given quantity X as obtained from N measurements i.e. the data.
It is well known that mN approaches the correct mean, m, in the limit of
N → ∞. Even better, one can estimate how fast such convergence is attained
by inspecting the mean square departure from the mean, also known as the
variance, namely:
σ2N =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi −mN )2, (2)
Under fairly general assumptions, it can be shown that the root-mean-square
(rms) departure from the mean decays like 1/
√
N . With enough measurements,
uncertainty surrenders: this is the triumph of Big Data [3].
Now let us ask ourselves: what are the “general assumptions” we alluded to
above? The answer is that the variables xi must: (i) be uncorrelated, i.e. each
outcome xi is independent of the previous one and does not affect the next one
either, (ii) exhibit a finite variance. As we shall see, neither of the two should
be taken for granted.
With these two premises, the central limit theorem pertaining to LLN shows
that the sum XN obeys Gaussian statistics, i.e. a bell shaped curve
pG(y) =
1
2piσ
e−y
2/2 (3)
where y = (x−m)/σ is the normalized (de-trended) version of x (here x stands
for any generic stochastic variable).
The Gaussian distribution exhibits many important properties, but here we
shall focus on the following one: Outliers stand very poor chances of mani-
festing themselves, and precisely because they are the carriers of uncertainty,
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uncertainty is heavily suppressed. Then the numbers indeed speak for them-
selves: the probability of finding an event one-sigma away from the mean is
about 30 percent, a number which goes down to just 4.5 percent at two-sigma.
The demise of uncertainty is dramatic, at five-sigma, we find just about half
a million and at six-sigma less than two in a billion! This adumbrates a very
comfortable world, where uncertainty has no chances because outliers are heav-
ily suppressed; fluctuations recede and are absorbed within the mean, an overly
powerful attractor. A comfortable, if somewhat grey, world of stable and reas-
suring conformity.
The Gaussian distribution plays a undeniable role across all walks of science
and society, to the point of still being regarded by many as a universal descrip-
tor of uncertainty. The truth is that, for all its monumental importance, the
Gaussian distribution is far from being universal. In fact, it fails to describe
most phenomena where complexity holds sway.
Why? Basically, because: complex systems, almost by definition, are cor-
related! When a turbulent whiff is ejected from the wind-shield of our car, it
affects the surrounding air flow, so that the next whiff will meet with an envi-
ronment which is not the same it would have met in the absence of the previous
whiff. The system affects its environment, the two are correlated, the statistics
of whiffs (turbulence) is not Gaussian. This is a far cry from the “fair coin”, in
which head or tail now has no effect on head or tail at the next toss. In complex
systems the coin is hardly fair. As a result, the statistics of correlated events
is much more tolerant towards outliers, with the consequence of a much higher,
sometimes even unbounded, variance. In a nutshell, it is a world much more
full of (good and bad) surprises, just as is real life!
The prototypical example is the Lorentz distribution:
pL(x) =
a/pi
a2 + (x−m)2 (4)
For inliers, |x−m| << a, this is virtually indistinguishable from a Gaussian,
and all is fine and well. But for events far in excess of a, outliers or rare events
in the following, the difference is dramatic: the Lorentz distribution decays
much more slowly than the Gaussian, which is the reason why its variance is
formally infinite; see Figure 1. As an example, if human heights were distributed
according to Lorentz, with an average m = 1.75 (meters) and a = 10 cm, the
probability of finding a human 2.75 meters high, i.e. at 10σ, would be of the
order of three percent. The decay is so slow as to sound ridiculous: going to
20σ just halves the number, which means that walking along the street of any
city in the world, humans 3.75 m high would be commonplace!1 Ridiculous as
it seems for human heights (which are indeed Gaussian-distributed), such slow
decay of outliers is a regular occurrence in complex systems, be they natural,
financial or social. The dire consequences of treating the financial world as a
Gaussian-regulated one are most compellingly (and often hilariously) discussed
in Taleb’s books “Fooled by Randomness” [4] and “The Black Swan” [5].
1For the detail-thirsty, this probability is computed by means of the cumulative distribution
of the Lorentz function, namely PL(x) = 1/2 +
1
pi
atan(x−m
a
).
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Figure 1: A comparison of Gaussian and Lorentzian distributions. Note the
persistence in the latter distribution of far larger events from the mean.
Infinite variance is a bit far-fetched, since in the real world signals and mea-
surements are necessarily finite, but the message comes across loud and clear:
the mean and the variance are no longer sufficient to capture the statistical
nature of the phenomenon. For this purpose higher order moments must be
inspected.
By moments, we mean sums (integrals in continuum space, with due care)
of the form
Mq =
N∑
i=1
xqi (5)
where q is usually (but not necessarily) a positive integer. By normalising
with M0 = N , it is clear that M1 is the mean and M2 −M21 is the variance.
For a Gaussian distribution, this is all we need to know, because all higher-
order moments with q > 2 follow directly from these two. But for a generic
distribution this is no longer the case and more moments need be specified;
in particular, from the very definition, it is readily appreciated that large q′s
give increasing weight to large x′s, i.e. the aforementioned rare-events play
an increasing role. Thus, inspection of Mq with q > 2 is paramount to the
understanding of complex processes, an utterly non-Gaussian world trailblazed
by the turbulence community and now widespread to most walks of the science
of complexity. The bottomline is that, in the presence of correlations, Gaussian
statistics no longer hold, and uncertainty does not give in so easily under data
pressure, in that the convergence to zero uncertainty is much slower than the
inverse square-root law. For a moment of order q, it is likely to be N−1/q, which
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is a nearly flat in practice for q >> 2. For instance, with q = 8, cutting down
uncertainty by a factor of 2 takes 28 = 256 times more data.
This explains why the BD trumpets should be toned down: when rare events
are not so rare, convergence rates can be frustratingly slow even in the face of
petabytes of data.
3.1 To Gauss or not to Gauss: nonlinear correlations
It is natural to ask if there is a qualitative criterion to predict whether a given
system would or would not obey Gaussian statistics. While these authors are not
aware of any rigorous “proof” in this direction, robust heuristics are certainly
available. We have mentioned before that the law of large numbers rests on the
assumption that the sequence of stochastic events be uncorrelated, that is, the
occurrence of a given realisation does not depend on the previous occurrences
and does not affect the subsequent ones. This is obviously an idealisation, but
one which eminently works well, as long as the system in point can be treated
as isolated from its environment and not subject to any form of nonlinearity.
Yet, by definition, most complex systems do interact with their environment and
they affect it in various ways. Since the environment couples back to the system,
it is clear that self-reinforcing or self-destroying loops get set up in the process.
Self-reinforcing loops imply that a given occurrence affects the environment in
such a way as to make such an occurrence more likely to happen again in the
future. This is the basic mechanism giving rise to persistent correlations, the
unfair coin we alluded to earlier on in this paper. And persistent correlations are
a commonplace in most complex systems, be they natural, financial, political,
psychological or social.
4 Sensitivity to data inaccuracies
The main goal of BD is to extract patterns from data, i.e. to unveil correlations
between apparently disconnected phenomena. Given two processes, say X =
{xi} and Y = {yi}, i = 1, N the standard measure of their correlation is the
covariance, defined as
C(X,Y ) =
∑N
i=1 xiyi
σxσy
(6)
where the sequences xi and yi are assumed to be de-trended, i.e. of zero-mean.
The most perfect correlation is Y = X, which delivers C = 1, its opposite
being perfect anti-correlation, Y = −X, yielding C = −1. Also interesting is
the case of plain indifference, zero-correlation C = 0, which means that sets of
positively and negatively correlated events are in perfect balance. In geometrical
language, C = 0 implies that the two N-dimensional vectors X and Y are
orthogonal. Adhering to this language, the correlation C can be thought of as
the cosine of the angle between the vectors X and Y , in which case we write
C = (X,Y )/(σxσy), where (, ) denotes the scalar product in Euclidean space.
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Figure 2: Note the presence of multiple hidden layers within which specific pro-
cessing activity takes place, between the input and output layers of processing
elements, called neurons.
Needless to say, under Gaussian statistics, correlation coefficients converge to
the “exact” values in the limit of infinite N .
But again, this is not necessarily the case if X and Y stem from complex pro-
cesses. Moreover, quadratic correlators, such as the covariance in eq. (6), which
originate directly from the notion of Euclidean distance d(X,Y ) =
∑
i(yi−xi)2,
may not be adequate to capture the complex nature of the phenomena, just as
mean and variance are by no means the full story in the presence of rare events!
In particular, higher order “distances”, possibly not even Euclidean ones, should
be inspected, their resilience to data pressure being inevitably much higher than
the one offered by the variance. Once again, error convergence might be a very
slow function of data size.
A similar argument goes for more sophisticated forms of learning, such as
the currently all-popular machine learning. Here, a neural net is trained to
recognise patterns within a given set of data, by adjusting the weights of the
connections in such a way as to minimise a given error functional (cost func-
tion in machine-learning jargon). Given a set of input data xi, the neural net
produces a corresponding output yi of the form
yi = f(
∑
j
Wijxj)
where Wij is the connecting weight between nodes i and j belonging to two
subsequent layers of the network and f() a suitable transfer function, typically
a sigmoid or variations thereof. See Figure 2.
The output signal is then compared to the target data Yi to form the loss
function
E{W} =
N∑
i=1
d(yi, Yi)
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where d(x, y) is some metric distance in data space, usually, but not necessarily,
the standard Euclidean one.
The weights are then updated according to some dynamic minimisation
schedule, so as to achieve the minimum error. It is then clear that if the func-
tional E{W} is smooth, the search is easy and robust against data inaccuracies.
If, on the other hand, the error landscape is corrugated, the expected case for
complex systems in which higher order moments carry most of the relevant in-
formation, even small inaccuracies can result in the wrong set of weights, where
wrong means that such weights are likely to fail when applied to new data
beyond those they had been trained for. See Figure 3
Of course, failsafe scenarios also exist, whereby different sets of weights work
even though they differ considerably from each other, because all local minima
are basically equivalent quasi-solutions of the optimisation problem. We sus-
pect, without proof, that such a form of benevolence lies at the basis of most
remarkable successes of machine learning and modern artificial intelligence ap-
plications.
But this cannot be assumed to be the universal rule: a big red light is
there in general, the name of the game being “overfitting”, that is a stiff so-
lution exists which reproduces very well a given set of data, but fails grossly
as soon as the dataset is enlarged, if only slightly. Although well-known to the
machine-learning scientific community, these problems are typically swept under
the carpet by the most ardent Big Data aficionados.
5 The two distant sisters: Correlation and Cau-
sation
The fact that correlation does not imply causation is such a well-known topic
that we only mention it for completeness.
It is indeed well recognised that even if two signals manage to register a
very high correlation coefficient C (close to 1), this does not necessarily imply
that they are mechanistically related. They may be false correlations (FC), as
opposed to true correlations (TC), the latter signalling a true causal connection.
The matter lends itself to hilarious observations: the rate of drowning by falling
in a pool appears tightly correlated with Nicolas Cage’s movies: unless one
assumes that Cage’s movies are so badly received to induce some to drown
themselves, there is little question that this is a false correlation. This case is
trivial, but the general problem is not: distinguishing between TC’s and FC’s
is an art, as the problem is both hard and important. The embarrassing fact
is that false correlations grow much more rapidly with size of data set under
investigation than the true ones (the nuggets). As recently proven by Calude
and Longo [7] the TC/FC ratio is a very steeply decreasing function of data
size. Meng, on the other hand, has shown that to be able to make statistically
reliable inferences one needs to have access to a very substantial (i.e. > 50%)
fraction of the data on which to perform one’s machine learning [8].
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Figure 3: Examples of three classes of landscapes that may be encountered in
connecting input to output variables, shown in three dimensions but typically
in fact arising in much higher dimensions which cannot be drawn. (a) shows
a relatively smooth (i.e. continuous) landscape over which machine learning
algorithms might be expected to perform well; (b) is a fractal landscape which
is not differentiable and contains structure on all length scales; (c) shows an-
other discontinuous landscape with no gradients. Both (b) and c) would not
be expected to perform reliably in the context of machine-learning algorithms.
Reproduced from Coveney et al. [6]
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Once again, how big is big enough to make reliable machine learning pre-
diction remains a very open question. To be sure, we are a very far cry from
the comfortable inverse square root law of Gaussian statistics. What is clearly
required in the field of big data and machine learning is many more theorems
that reliably specify the domain of validity of the methods and the amounts of
data to produce statistically reliable conclusions. One recent paper that sets
out the way forward is by Karbalayghareh et al. [9]
6 Life in a finite world: too much data is like no
data
Finally, there is an argument that hinges directly on epistemology and society,
since it has to do with a most prized human attribute: wisdom, the ability to
take the right decision. Wisdom is often represented as the top level of a pyra-
mid of four, the DIKW (Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom) chain, the one
enabling us to take well-informed decisions. From Data we extract Information,
from Information we extract Knowledge and finally from Knowledge we distil
the ultimate goal: Wisdom, the ability to do the “right thing”; see Figure 4.
Big Data driven decision theory is obviously of paramount importance to
science, business and society, as it is to each of our private lives. But, as a matter
of fact, the “constitutive relation” between Data and Information, Information
vs Knowledge and Knowledge vs Wisdom is not well known, to put it mildly.
In the following, we shall argue that the pyramid representation is deceptive,
for it conveys the idea that the layers stand in a simple linear relationship to
one another, which is by no means the case. More importantly, it suggests that
by expanding the basis (data) all upper-lying layers will expand accordingly,
whence the mantra: more data, more wisdom.
This flies in the face of a very general fact of life: sooner or later, all finite
systems hit their ceiling. the technical name of the game being nonlinear satura-
tion, another well known concept in the science of complex systems. This is the
very general competition-driven phenomenon by which increasing data supply
leads to saturation and sometimes even loss of information; adding further data
actually destroys information. But let’s discuss saturation first. A well-known
example of non-linear saturation is logistic growth in population dynamics. Let
x be the number of individuals of a given species which reproduce at a rate
a > 0, say a births per year. In differential terms dx/dt = ax, leading to un-
tamed exponential growth. But obviously in a finite environment, with finite
space and a finite amount of food, such untamed growth cannot last forever for
the environmental finiteness will necessarily generate competition, hence a de-
pletion term. Assuming competition is only between two individuals at a time,
this results in the famous logistic equation
dx
dt
= ax− bx2 (7)
where bmeasures the strength of competition. The right hand side is the epitome
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of what we mean, the rate of change growing linearly with x but beyond a certain
threshold, x∗ = a/2b, it decreases until it comes to a halt at x = a/b. By then
the population stops growing, and the number of individuals left at that point
is x = a/b, also known as the capacity of the system. It is readily seen that the
capacity goes inversely with the competition rate: the fiercer the competitors,
the higher their needs and the lesser their number. As expected, big consumers
present a threat, as is well known to those not driving four-by-four vehicles in
the crowded streets of Rome and London.
The right hand side of (7) can be cast in a more informative form as follows:
R(x) = bx(c− x) (8)
where R indicates the effective rate and c = a/b is the capacity.
This shows a nice symmetry (duality) between the population x and the co-
population x¯ = c−x, namely the gap between the actual number of individuals
and the system’s capacity. Such symmetry is further exposed by writing the
equations in dual form
dx
dt
= bxx¯ (9)
dx¯
dt
= −bxx¯ (10)
Writing the equation in this manner highlights the dual process of generating
population (“matter”) and annihilating co-population (“co-matter”). In pass-
ing, we note that the above system is invariant under the exchange x ↔ x¯, in
combination with time inversion t→ −t, which means that the backward-time
evolution of the co-population is the same as the forward-time evolution of the
population. Such types of dual relations are typical of finite-size systems hosting
nonlinear cooperative/competitive interactions, in the generalised form
R(x) = bxα (c− x)β
where the exponents α and β, as well as the coefficients, may change depending
on the specific phenomenon at hand. But the dual structure remains because it
reflects the existence of a finite capacity. The above example refers to popula-
tion growth in time, which is not necessarily related to the information growth
with data. Nevertheless, it is our everyday experience that, beyond a certain
threshold, further data does not add any information, simply because additional
data contain less and less new information, and ultimately no new information
at all.
This is quite common in complex systems: for instance, the number of de-
grees of freedom of a turbulent flow (Information) grows like R9/4, where R is
the so-called Reynolds number a dimensionless group measuring the strength of
nonlinearity of fluid equations, whereas the volume of space (data) hosting the
turbulent flow grows like R3 (because R scales like the linear size of the volume).
Hence the information density, i.e. the physical information per unit volume,
scales like I/V = R9/4−3 = R−3/4 a very steep decay at increasing Reynolds
11
Figure 4: A depiction of the DIKW pyramid to show the cooperation between
big-data and modelling. It displays how “data”, when put in context, leads to
“information”; analysing the “information” yields “knowledge”; “knowledge”
gained can be deeply understood by hypothesising a model for its underlying
cause leading to “wisdom” which can be utilised to optimise the model by
repeating the process.
number. Given that R of the order of a million or more is a commonplace in
real-life, it is clear that adding volume provides increasingly less return on in-
vestment in terms of gain of physical information. We speculate, without proof,
that this a general rule in the natural world.
Let us now come to the worst-case scenario: data which destroy information.
Eventually, additional data may even contradict previous data, perhaps because
of inaccuracy but more devious scenarios are not hard to imagine, thereby de-
stroying information, because the new and the old data annihilate each other.
In the latter scenario, information gain turns into information loss: seeing too
much starts to be like not seeing enough, to borrow from C.S. Lewis again.
We argue that such a dual trend applies to the DIKW chain as well, at least
to the two lower layers: too much data is just like no data all. In fact this
is possibly still more general: in a finite world, close to capacity, competitive
interactions arise which either annihilate the return on investment (information
per data unit) or even make it negative, thereby destroying information and
productivity, over-communication being a well-known example in point2.
Of course one can argue that, in actual practice, this depends on where the
capacity is, so that BD can move it upwards and shift the problem away. We
2 Incidentally, the reader should appreciate that away from capacity, the logistic equation
(8) equation is linear because when x c, then c− x ∼ c
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argue that this threshold shifting is close to a chimera with lack of insight. Unless
we can apprehend the logical structures underlying any given phenomenon, we
may just keep generating data conflicts that data accumulation alone will not
be able to resolve, in fact quite the opposite.
In science, we strive to go from data-starved to data-rich, yet a blind data-
driven procedure, as often advocated by the most enthusiastic BD neophytes,
may well take us from data-rich to data-buried science, unless a just dose of
theoretical reasoning is used as an antidote [10].
More importantly, we all live in a finite world, and sooner or later its finite
capacity is going to be noticed. Even though such a basic reality is a taboo
for many commercially inspired promoters of big data, we had better prepare
for that. Aggressive BD distracts attention from our limits, which is pretty
dangerous for society long before it is for science. Indeed, whatever philosophical
stance one may adopt, it is clear that treating our resources as if they were
unlimited is a sure way to disasters of various sorts, be they environmental,
financial or social.
7 Knowledge for Business: Big Data and Big
Lies
Good business is beneficial, and so is any healthy driver of economic wealth.
Hailing the pursuit of knowledge and innovation as a Trojan horse for business
is not.
Big Data has a potentially enormous bearing on society, as is reflected by
Pentland’s recent book Social Physics [11], the discipline which endeavours to
explain, predict and influence human behaviour (for good) based on physical-
mathematical principles, treating individuals as “thinking molecules”. The
concept is technically appealing, although one clearly walking on a very thin
tightrope between good-willed science and social manipulation. In principle,
one can think of society as the “material made up of thinking molecules” and
ask how to best design such “material”, so as to optimise moral values, while be-
ing bereft of cheating with flourishing economies, social equity and so on along
a rosy-carpeted avenue. In fact, such models provide scientific underpinning
to Bauman’s illuminating metaphor of a liquid society as one where the rules
change faster than most individuals can adjust to, leaving the majority behind
[12]. Influencing human behaviour through “healthy” social pressure and flow
of ideas is a noble goal, albeit one which walks on a high wire, the name of the
(bad) game being plain manipulation for profit. More precisely, what is hailed
as pursuit of knowledge and innovation is in fact a very different goal, named
zero sales resistance.
Zero sales resistance is an obvious goal for the most rapacious forms of
capitalism, spinning around the money for money’s sake paradigm, instead of
more conventional capitalism, in which money is the just and natural follow-on
from healthy innovation, filling true societal gaps.
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The damage done by BD brainware at the service of rapacious capitalism is
all too evident: acquisition of private data in return for the dream of “celebrity
for everyone” is a super-clever strategy, one that hits at the very roots of human
weakness.
Pentland, being well aware of the danger, invokes a new deal on data. But
best intentions are easily fooled; so, here again C.S. Lewis appears apposite:
“When man proclaims conquest of power of nature, what it really means is
conquest of power of some men over other men”. When social media hit at
human weaknesses, such as the desperate need for fame through a growing list of
“followers”, collecting money for the disaster brought about by a tsunami might
be a very good thing, but does not change the final balance sheet: mankind
looses anyway.
A similar story applies to the big claims that cross the border into big lies,
such as the promises of the so called “Master Algorithm”, allegedly capable of
extracting all the information from the data, doing everything, just everything
we want, even before we ask for it. [13]
In this essay, we hope we have made it clear why some of the boldest claims
of BD are in fact little or nothing short of big lies, that is:
1. Complex systems support uncertainty to a much stronger degree than the
Law of Large Numbers (Gaussian statistics) would have us believe. The
implication is that error decay with data volume is considerably slower,
to the point of becoming impractically slow even in the face of zettabytes;
2. No system is infinite, but when operating to their maximal extent, complex
systems support the onset of competitive interactions, in turn leading to
data conflicts, which may either saturate the return on investment (in
terms of the information gained per unit of data) or even make it negative
by supplying more data than a finite-capacity system can process. Those
BD aficionados who promise us “all we want and more” simply choose to
ignore this, and it is not hard to see why.
3. In the end, most of BD builds down to more or less sophisticated forms of
curve fitting based on error minimisation. Such minimisation procedures
fare well if the error landscape is smooth, but they exhibit fragility towards
corrugated ones in other situations, which are the rule in complex systems
(Figure 3).
Given these properties of nonlinear systems, the idea of replacing under-
standing with glorified curve fitting, no matter how “clever”, appears a pretty
questionable bargain, to put it mildly. In this context, it is amusing to recall a
conversation between Enrico Fermi and Freeman Dyson in 1952 [14]:
Fermi: How many parameters did you use in your calculations?
Dyson: Four.
Fermi: My friend John von Neumann used to say with four parameters, I can
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fit an elephant and with five, I can make him wiggle his trunk.
And with that, the conversation was over.
8 What can be done?
Once radical empiricism, hype-blinded high-tech optimism and the most rapa-
cious forms of business motivation, are filtered out, what remains of Big Data
is nonetheless a serious and promising scientific methodology. In the end, how-
ever, it is nothing other than an elaborate form of curve fitting, but this is
not intended as a dismissive statement: sophisticated forms of inference, search
and optimisation are involved in this activity, which deserve credit and respect,
although certainly not awe.
There is no doubt that the “big data/machine learning/artificial intelligence”
approach has plenty of scope to play a creative and important role in addressing
major scientific problems. Among the applications, pattern recognition is par-
ticularly powerful in detecting patterns which might otherwise remain hidden
indefinitely (modulo the problem of false positives mentioned earlier). Possibly
the most important role is likely to be in establishing patterns which then de-
mand further explanation, where scientific theories are required to make sense
of what is discovered. We have written elsewhere [6] of the fact that rapid
“successes” of BD approaches take far longer to turn into sources of scientific
insight.
In passing, however, we cannot refrain from commenting on the resurgence
of use of the term “artificial intelligence” in this context, more than forty years
after Marvin Minsky’s unfortunate claim that computers were just a few years
away from emulating human intelligence. That wild claim led to decades long
“AI winter” from which one observes not only a thaw but the extravagant hype
accompanying any claimed successes of the BD approach. We do not propose
to digress into a discussion of AI, other than to point out that the concept has
been subjected to penetrating analysis among others by Roger Penrose [15], who
argues cogently that no digital computer will ever be capable of matching the
human brain in terms of its ability to resolve problems such as those that reside
in the class of the Go¨delian undecidable. It matters not one iota that a so-called
“AI machine” has the capability of assimilating the contents of staggeringly vast
numbers texts (Tegmark [16]).
In the final part of this essay, we focus rather on the positive aspects, namely
how BD might assist with the struggle of the human mind to overcome three
notorious barriers: non-linearity, non-locality and hyperdimensional spaces.
8.1 Nonlinearity
Nonlinearity is a notoriously tough cookie for theoretical modelling, for various
reasons, primarily because nonlinear systems do not respond in proportion to
the extent to which they are prompted. The most spectacular and popular
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metaphor of nonlinearity is the well known “butterfly” effect, namely the little
butterfly beating her wings in Cuba and triggering a hurricane in Miami in the
process. This is the ominous side of nonlinearity, the one that hits straight at
our ability to predict the future, the harbinger of uncertainty.
Less widely known perhaps is the sunny side of nonlinearity, that is its
constructive power, which is most apparent in biology where it underlies spatio-
temporal organisation. We shall not delve any further into this vital edifice
of modern science [17]. Up to half a century ago, nonlinearity was hidden
under the carpet of science for two good reasons. First, many systems under
comparatively small loads, do respond linearly indeed (consider, for example, the
logistic equation away from capacity). Second, linear systems are incomparably
easier to be dealt with on mathematical grounds. It was only in the 1960s, with
the birth of chaos theory, that nonlinearity started to be fully embraced by the
scientific method, and it has continued to advance across all fields of science
ever since.
While BD can certainly be of assistance in tackling some of the vagaries
of non-linear systems, the fractal nature of many nonlinear dynamical systems
utterly defies any notion of the smooth mappings upon which essentially all
machine learning algorithms are based, rendering them nugatory from the outset
in such contexts. Indeed, the discontinuous nature of many nonlinear systems
is simply not amenable to approaches based on machine learning’s common
assumptions that relationships are smooth and differentiable.
8.2 Nonlocality
A further source of difficulty for scientific investigation is nonlocality understood
as meaning the presence of long range correlations, by which we mean that
interactions between entities (such as particles or fluid domains) decay very
slowly with increasing distance. The classical example is the gravitational many-
body problem, in which the force decays with the square of the inverse distance
between two bodies. Nonlocality is a problem because it generates an all-to-all
interaction scenario in which the computational complexity grows quadratically
with the number of interacting units. The problem is far more acute in the
quantum context, where nonlocality takes the form of the once-dreaded “action
at a distance”, or more precisely to entanglement, meaning that different parts
of a system remain causally connected even when they are arbitrarily far apart.
This challenges our basic intuition that things interact most when they are in
close proximity.
Leaving aside abundant metaphysical and science fiction based ramifications,
entanglement stands as a highly counter-intuitive and difficult phenomenon to
deal with by the current methods of theoretical science. Addressing quantum
correlations with machine learning is plainly a major challenge.
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8.3 Hyper-dimensions
We are used to living in three-spatial dimensions, plus time, and we are clearly
often in difficulty in going further. In fact, visualizing objects, not to mention
dynamic phenomena, in just three dimensions seems to be complicated enough,
as everyone dealing with visualisation software knows all too well. Yet most
problems inhabit a much larger domain, known as phase-space.
Macroscopic systems consist of a huge number of individual components,
typically in the order of the Avogadro number Av ∼ 6×1023 for the case of stan-
dard quantities of matter that we encounter. If each component is endowed with
just six degrees of freedom, say its position in space and its velocity, this makes
six times Avogadro’s number of variables, namely a mathematical problem in
six times Avogadro’s number of dimensions. Such is the monster-dimensionally
that matters for many modelling purposes.
Thanks to a gracious gift “we neither understand, nor deserve” in Eugene
Wigner’s words [18], much can be learned about these systems by solving prob-
lems in a much lower number of dimensions using the methods of statistical
mechanics [19]. Even so, the task of modelling complex systems, say weather
forecasting, protein folding, just to name two outstanding problems in modern
science, remains very hard [6].
Calculating the electronic structure of molecules is firmly in the class of com-
putationally intractable problems. Accurate calculations scale factorially in the
size of the basis sets used and render the highest levels of theory/accuracy essen-
tially unattainable for anything other than the smallest of molecular systems.
Here, considerable hype if not expectation has been focused on the construction
of working quantum computers which would exhibit a special form of “quantum
parallelism” that allows even such kinds of classically intractable problems to
be solved on feasible time scales. There is absolutely no chance of BD/ML/AI
being applicable here: each problem is in a class of its own, and there are not
going to be sufficient examples of solved problems available any time soon on
which inference based approaches could even begin to be contemplated.
What is curious about the current fad for quantum computing is that, as
with BD etc., the hype is at its peak in the big corporations, such as Microsoft,
Google, IBM, and so on who make claims we will have a working quantum com-
puter in five years (we are excluding the D-Wave adiabatic quantum variant).
These are the very same corporations which inundate us with reminders of the
power of BD/ML/AI. And remarkably, one of the applications they say would
be a “killer app” is in quantum chemistry, for the discovery of future drugs, at
the same time as they promote BD methods to do the same thing.
9 A new scientific deal
It would be highly desirable if BD and particularly machine-learning techniques
could help surmount the three basic barriers to our understanding described
above.
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For now, however, in hard-core physical science at least, there is little evi-
dence of any major BD-driven breakthroughs, at least not in fields where insight
and understanding rather than zero sales resistance is the prime target: physics
and chemistry do not succumb readily to the seduction of BD/ML/AI. It is
extremely rare for specialists in these domains to simply go out and collect vast
quantities of data, bereft of any guiding theory as to why it should be done.
There are some exceptions, perhaps the most intriguing of which is astronomy,
where sky scanning telescopes scrape up vast quantities of data for which ma-
chine learning has proved to be a powerful way of processing it and suggesting
interpretations of recorded measurements. In subjects where the level of theo-
retical understanding is deep, it is deemed aberrant to ignore it all and resort
to collecting data in a blind manner. Yet this is precisely what is advocated
in the less theoretically well grounded disciplines of biology and medicine, not
to speak of social sciences and economics. The oft-repeated mantra of the life
sciences, as the pursuit of “hypothesis driven research”, has been cast aside in
favour of large data collection activities [6].
And, if the best minds are employed in large corporations to work out how to
persuade people to click on online advertisements instead of cracking hard-core
science problems, not much can be expected to change in the years to come.
An even more acute story goes for social sciences and certainly for business,
where the burgeoning growth of BD, more often than not fuelled by bombastic
claims, is a compelling fact, with job offers towering over the job market to an
astonishing extent. But, as we hope we have made clear in this essay, BD is by
no means the panacea its extreme aficiodonas want to portray to us and, most
importantly, to funding agencies. It is neither Archimedes’ fulcrum, nor the end
of insight.
Therefore, instead of rendering theory, modelling and simulation obsolete,
BD should and will ultimately be used to complement and enhance it. Exam-
ples are flourishing in the current literature, with machine learning techniques
being embedded to assist large-scale simulations of complex systems in mate-
rials science, turbulence [20, 21, 22] and also to provide major strides towards
personalised medicine [10], a prototypical problem for which statistical knowl-
edge will never be a replacement for patient-specific modelling [6]. It is not hard
to predict that major progress may result from an inventive blend of the two,
perhaps emerging as a new scientific methodology.
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